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A REPLY ON "CHARTER DIALOGUE
REVISITED '©
PETER W. HOGG, ALLISON A. BUSHELL THORNTON & WADE K.
WRIGHT
I. OUR OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY
We have been given an opportunity to make a brief reply to the
six commentaries on our "Charter Dialogue Revisited" article.' This
seemed like a good idea, before we had actually seen the commentaries
and discovered the extent of the thoughtful and wide-ranging ideas.
There is no way to "reply" in a summary way to the many interesting
points that are made in the commentaries, some in disagreement, and
others more in the way of elaboration. All we will try to do in this reply
is to identify points that are central to our thesis' and discuss the
commentaries on those points.
II. THE "DIALOGUE" THESIS
The thesis of the original 1997 article, "Charter Dialogue,"3
which we reaffirmed in "Charter Dialogue Revisited," is that the
© 2007, P.W. Hogg, A.A. Thornton & W.K. Wright.
'Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors"' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 ["Charter Dialogue
Revisited"].
2 For example, most of the commentaries deal with the legitimacy of judicial review, which
was understandable since we raised the issue in the " Charter Dialogue Revisited" article. However,
since dialogue theory is not part of the justification of judicial review, it is not central to our
concerns, and we will not add to the mountain of literature on this highly contested topic of
constitutional theory. As another example, several of the comments deal with the idea that
legislatures should have a coordinate power of interpretation of the Charter. That is a topic we
covered at length in the "Charter Dialogue Revisited" article, and we have nothing to add.to that
treatment.
' Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" Charter Dialogue"].
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structure of the Charter4 (and especially section 1) generally leaves
room for the competent legislative body to respond to a court decision
striking down a law on Charter grounds by enacting a new law that
accomplishes the legislative purpose by other means. This thesis
emerged from our analysis of the legislative sequels to all the cases in
which laws had been struck down on Charter grounds since the adoption
of the Charter in 1982. We found that in most cases the competent
legislative body had replaced the invalid law with a new law that
accomplished the same policy purposes as the invalid law, albeit often
with some new civil libertarian safeguards. We were surprised by the
fact that the legislative body typically had the last word. We used the
word "dialogue" to describe the phenomenon of legislative sequels, and
we concluded that Canada had a weaker form of judicial review than
had been assumed by commentators on the Charter. In "Charter
Dialogue Revisited," we researched the sequels to the cases that had
been decided since the 1997 article and found that the same pattern had
continued: decisions striking down laws were usually followed by a new
law that accomplished essentially the same legislative objective. The
dialogue that we had identified in 1997 was still alive and well.
III. EFFECT OF DIALOGUE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Of the six commentators, Grant Huscroft and Andrew Petter
have the most radical concerns with the dialogue thesis. They take the
view that dialogue theory liberates courts to become more activist in
their application of the Charter, and that this is a bad thing.' We agree
that this would be a bad thing. On the other hand, it is impossible not to
feel flattered by the attribution of such influence to our writing, which
would normally be of little interest outside legal academic circles.
However, we must set our egos aside, and confess that there is no
credible danger that the courts have used or will use dialogue theory to
expand their role of judicial review.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter.
'Grant Huscroft, "Constitutionalism from the Top Down," (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 91
(at passim, by implication); Andrew Petter, "Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or
Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't Such A Good Thing After All)" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 147 at
150, n. 6 ("dialogue theory can encourage courts to become more activist").
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One problem with the view that dialogue theory encourages
activist judicial review is that dialogue theory cannot explain the
decisions of the Court that were described in the 1997 article, "Charter
Dialogue," because, of course, they were rendered before the article was
written. And that was a period of extraordinary judicial activism. We
counted no less than sixty-six laws (forty-three federal and twenty-three
provincial) that had been struck down from 1982 to 1995. Many of the
laws that were struck down were very important, dealing with, for
example, abortion, film censorship, election expenditures, language of
signs in Quebec, Sunday closing, religious education in schools, refugee
determination, qualifications for unemployment insurance, the
definition of murder, the defence of drunkenness, "rape-shield"
restrictions on cross-examination, disposition of persons acquitted on
account of insanity, search warrant procedures, and reverse onus clauses
in the Criminal Code,6 to name just a few.
In contrast to that period of activism, the period since the
publication of the 1997 article has seen a decline in the rate of laws
being struck down.7 As Kent Roach notes in his commentary, this
decline may simply mean that laws enacted in the Charter era have been
subject to Charter vetting before their enactment, but, as he also points
out, it may also signal increased deference on the part of the Court.'
There are, in fact, indications of increased deference. For example, the
Court has introduced restrictions oh the equality guarantee, which make
it difficult for equality claimants to succeed.9 The Court has stopped
using the cruel and unusual punishment clause to strike down minimum
mandatory sentences." The Court's application of the speedy trial
guarantee has gone from frequent to rare."t The Court has stopped
using section 7 of the Charter (and the Court's notion of "stigma") to
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
' In the 1997 article, we reported sixty-six cases in which laws were struck down. In the
"Charter Dialogue Revisited" article, we reported twenty-three cases. Despite the shorter period of
comparison, this is a lower rate of striking down.
' Kent Roach, "Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship" (2007)
45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 169 at 189-190.
' Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (introducing a new requirement of an impairment of
human dignity, which few equality claimants are able to establish).
10 Contrast R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, with R. v. Latimer, [200111 S.C.R. 3.
" Contrast R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, with R. v. Dutra, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 759.
'2007]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
prescribe the mental element of crimes.12 It is also interesting to
compare the use of section 7 of the Charter in the forthright 1988
decision of Morgentaler,13 where a 5:2 majority of the Court struck
down, with immediate effect, the provisions of the Criminal Code that
risked the life and health of women by delaying access to abortion, with
the judicial hand-wringing in the 2005 decision of ChaouAi, 4 where the
Court divided evenly on the question of whether section 7 condemned
the state-induced waiting lists that risked life and health by delaying
access to other health care procedures. In the latter case, the tie was
broken by one judge (Justice Deschamps), who relied on the Quebec
Charte?5 to strike down the impugned law. The ultimate majority still
gave the province of Quebec a year to comply with the decision. We
conclude that the 1997 article certainly did not usher in a new period of
active judicial review. It almost certainly had no effect on the willingness
of the courts to strike down legislation. And no doubt, if the courts
really are as attentive to our writing as our critics seem to think, our
attempt in the "Charter Dialogue Revisited" article to reiterate and
clarify our thesis will further dampen any tendency to rely on the
dialogue thesis as a reason for striking down (or upholding) a law.
The reason why "Charter Dialogue" almost certainly had no
effect on the willingness of the courts to strike down legislation is that it
did not address that issue. The dialogue phenomenon that we reported
concerned the action taken by legislative bodies after judicial decisions
were rendered. It did not speak to how the judicial decisions shouldbe
rendered in the first place. This is clearly articulated in the commentary
by Richard Haigh and Michael Sobkin, who say: "Dialogue is thus the
consequence of a decision striking down legislation, not an independent
reason for striking it down."16 And, in their comprehensive survey of all
the judicial dicta using the dreaded term, they demonstrate that it is in
this sense that courts have usually understood the metaphor. They
criticize those few instances where the courts have used dialogue in a
12 The complex case law is discussed in P.W. Hogg,* Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed.,
supplemented (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), ss. 44.11-44.14 [Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada].
1 R. v. Morgentaler(No. 2), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentale].
'4 Chaoulli v. Ouebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [ Chaoulh].
's Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q.c. C-12.
1 Richard Haigh & Michael Sobkin, "Does the Observer Have an Effect?: An Analysis of
the Use of the Dialogue Metaphor in Canada's Courts" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 67 at 79.
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prescriptive sense, as a justification for judicial review of a law, including
cases where the metaphor is used to justify a suspended declaration of
invalidity.
17
The most that -could be said about "Charter Dialogue" as an
influence on judicial review is that a judge might be emboldened to
strike down a law in the knowledge that, in the past, legislative bodies
have often succeeded in re-enacting the substance of a law struck down
by judicial decision. But the existence of legislative sequels to other
decisions is simply an empirical fact that exists independently of the
1997 article. Even if we had refused to publish the article, and somehow
managed to suppress our findings of legislative sequels (or at least shield
them from the eyes of judges), the news of the phenomenon could
hardly remain secret indefinitely in an open society. Indeed, the impulse
for "Charter Dialogue" were the media accounts regarding the amount
of parliamentary time that was devoted to re-enacting laws struck down
by the Court. Obviously, judges might have noticed the same thing at the
same time. Although we found the phenomenon surprising, that does
not mean that others were similarly surprised. Both of our most severe
critics assert that there is nothing surprising about the phenomenon of
legislative sequels to decisions striking down laws on Charter grounds.8
Our reporting of the phenomenon could hardly be a watershed event in
the history of judicial review in Canada.
A similar misunderstanding of our dialogue thesis underlies
Christopher Manfredi's claim ("The Day the Dialogue Died"19) that the
Sauv& case"0 has "effectively brought an end to the short history of the
dialogue metaphor as a useful guide to judicial decision making."" As
we tried to point out in "Charter Dialogue Revisited," the dialogue
metaphor was never a useful guide to judicial decision making. In Sauvd
No. 2, it will be recalled, Chief Justice McLachlin, for the majority of the
Court, struck down a law that denied the right to vote to penitentiary
17 Ibid. at 89-90. In "Charter Dialogue Revisited," we took the view that this was one
judicial function to which the idea of dialogue could be helpful.
IS Huscroft, supra note 5 at 93 ("should come as no surprise"); Petter, supra note 5 at 166
("unremarkable insight," "banality").
' Christopher Manfredi, "The Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauv6 v. Canada"
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105.
2
oSauvd v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Sauv4 No. 2].
21 Supra note 19 at 106.
2007]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
inmates serving sentences of two years or more. This was a "second
look" case, because the Court had previously struck down a law that
denied the vote to all prison inmates.22 In striking down the second law,
Chief Justice McLachlin rejected the argument that the Court should
automatically defer to Parliament's second look, and she remarked that
dialogue should not be debased to a rule of "if at first you don't succeed,
try, try again."' The fact is that after Sauv6 No. 1, Parliament was left
with little latitude to craft a new law, because section 3 of the Charter
confers an unqualified right to vote on citizens of Canada, and section 3
is one of the few rights that is not subject to the section 33 override. A
limitation of the right under section 1 is theoretically possible, but the
limiting law would have to serve an important public purpose. For the
majority of the Court (although not the dissenting minority), no
sufficiently important purpose emerged in the parliamentary debate on
the sequel legislation.
Sauvd No. 2 is an interesting case, because, as Huscroft notes,24
the legislative desire to disenfranchise prisoners is probably impossible
to accomplish. This is one of the exceptional situations where no
legislative sequel can be designed, and therefore no dialogue can take
place. Manfredi and Huscroft are quite right to single the case out for
this reason. But the point to bear in mind is that the right to vote was
deliberately made exceptionally strong by the framers of the Charter,
and its foundational nature makes it hard to articulate a rational basis
for denying the right to prisoners. With respect to rights other than the
right to vote, nothing said or decided by the Court in Sauvd can change
the fact that, after a law is struck down for breach of the Charter, a
government will usuallybe successful in finding a way to enact a new law
that keeps the legislative purpose alive. The statistics in both "Charter
Dialogue" and "Charter Dialogue Revisited" demonstrate that. And
since many of us, including Petter,u rightly distrust a merely
"quantitative analysis," the appendices to the two articles26 describe
each case and each sequel, enabling the reader to make his or her own
2 2Sauvd v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 [Sauvd No. 1].
'Supra note 20 at 538.
24 Huscroft, supra note 5 at 93.
25 Petter, supra note 5 at 152-57.
26 Supra note 3 at 107-24; Supra note 1 at 55-65.
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'qualitative" evaluation of the degree to which the sequel legislation in
each case achieves the policy objectives of the law struck down.
IV. WEAK OR STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW
Our critics are intrigued by the question of whether Canada has
a "weak" or a "strong" form of judicial review. These are comparative
terms upon which reasonable people will differ. Carissima Mathen
argues that Canada has a strong form of judicial review because of the
range of remedies available to the Court, and she says that "the fact that
the legislature can respond-by changing the law or enacting a new
one-does not diminish the court's powers."27 Huscroft is also in the
strong camp, and he is right to point out that the statutory bills of rights
of New Zealand and the United Kingdom are weaker than the Charter
because they do not authorize the judicial invalidation of legislation.'
We do not argue that Canada has the weakest possible form of judicial
review. Our position is simply that the legislature's normal option of a
new law diminishes the dominance of judicial review over democratic
law-making. We agree that Canada's judicial review is still stronger than
that of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, where the courts cannot
strike down the law in the first place. (The analogy to their statutory
bills of rights is our old Canadian Bill of Rights.) However, we have no
doubt that Canada's judicial review is weaker than that in the United
States. That is the conclusion of Kent Roach, who has contrasted the
difficulty of overcoming constitutional decisions in the United States
with the greater ease with which that can be done in Canada.29
The features of the Charterthat are not present in the American
Bill of Rights are the limitation clause of section 1 and the override
clause of section 33. It is true that, despite the absence of these two
provisions, legislative sequels can often be enacted in the United States.
The persistence of most of the states in enacting capital punishment
statutes, despite the ever-increasing restrictions imposed by the U.S.
27 Carissima Mathen, "Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A
Comment on 'CharterDialogue Revisited' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125 at 145.
28 Huscroft, supra note 5 at 97.
29 K. Roach, "Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court decisions in
Canada and the United States" (2006) 4 Int'l J. Const. Law 347. See also C. Mathen,
"Constitutional Dialogue in Canada and the United States" (2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 403 (contrasting the
U.S. inability to modify the Miranda rule with the Canadian ability to modify the O'Connorrule).
2007]
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Supreme Court, is a good example. Moreover, as we recognized in
"Charter Dialogue Revisited," a considerable body of literature exists in
the United States on "dialogue." However, in the American literature,
"dialogue" is a term that has as many meanings as there are American
commentators. Since the publication of "Charter Dialogue," we have
tried to check periodically on the state of the American literature, and
we continue to be surprised that there is no published American study
that tracks the legislative sequels to all the cases in which laws were
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court for breach of the American Bill
of Rights. In short, there is no study that uses the term "dialogue" in the
sense that we used it, or that offers a direct comparison to our "Charter
Dialogue" and "Charter Dialogue Revisited" articles, with their
appendices of legislative sequels.
Huscroft and Petter each speculate (it can only be speculation)
that dialogue (in our sense) occurs just as frequently in the United
States as it does in Canada, and that we are wrong to assume that
Canada has a weaker form of judicial review than does the United
States.3" This conjecture will surprise the many commentators in the
United States who have struggled to reconcile judicial review with
democratic governance. Intuitively, it seems clear to us that our section
1 provides more flexibility for legislative sequels than does the
"definitional balancing" that takes place in the United States. However,
the big difference is our section 33. Section 33 changes the balance of
power between the judicial and legislative branches. In 1937, President
Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan was needed (until the Court changed
its mind) to protect his "New Deal" program; it would not have been
necessary in a country with a legislative override. The intense
controversies about the Supreme Court (and the ideology of the judges)
that have surrounded issues of school desegregation, prayer in the
schools, the Miranda warnings to criminal suspects, the burning of the
flag, and, above all, abortion, have all been driven by frustration that
neither the Congress nor the state legislative assemblies were competent
to change judicial rulings with which they profoundly disagreed. The
existence of a legislative override for Congress and the state legislatures
would have changed everything. It would certainly have been used on
each of the issues mentioned above.
30 Huscroft, supra note 5 at 95; Petter, supra note 5 at 160.
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The section 33 override is the basis for the legislative sequel in
only one of our recorded cases, and that is the case of the Quebec law
requiring that signs in Quebec be in French only. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada that struck down the law for breach of the
guarantee of freedom of expression was overridden by Quebec under
section 33.31 Because this is the only example of the use'of section 33 to
overcome a judicial decision, section 33 is unimportant in our statistics
of legislative sequels. However, we do not accept the assumptions of
Huscroft and Petter that section 33 is an unimportant feature of the
Charter. There is no reason to suppose that the current political
reluctance to use section 33 is a permanent feature of the Canadian
legal system, which will prevail no matter what the Court does, or how
public opinion changes, or which political paities come into power.32 On
the contrary, section 33 is part of the structure of the Charter, and it was
included in the Charter for the very purpose of preserving parliamentary
sovereignty on rights issues. As one of us has written elsewhere: "[S]o
long as the last word remains with the competent legislative body, there
can be no acute or longstanding conflict between the judicial and
legislative branches. ' '33 Make no mistake about it: if conflict between the
judicial and legislative branches in Canada ever approached the
intensity and duration of the conflict that occurred in the United States
during the Lochner era (1905-1937) or during, and just after, the
Warren Court (1953-1973) (and that continues to this day with respect
to abortion), the current reluctance by Canadian politicians to use the
override would disappear. Indeed, the use of the override by Quebec to
protect its French language policy is a reliable indication of what would
happen elsewhere in the country if a cherished policy were threatened
by the Court. Only the fact that public opinion outsideQuebec has not
been deeply disturbed by decisions of the Court has so far kept the
override locked up and out of sight.
Whether judicial review in Canada is weak or strong is a matter
on which wordsmiths may argue, but our conclusion is that judicial
review in Canada is weaker than it is in the United States. This fact has
3' The override was upheld in Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R1 712.
32 Huscroft, supra note 5 at 96 ("the notwithstanding clause is unused, and all but
unusable"); Petter, supra note 5 at 161 ("the political inability of legislatures to exercise [the
override power]").
' Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 12 at 36-11.
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protected us from the court-packing and court-bashing that are the
staples of political debate in the United States. Canadians do not care as
much as Americans about the personnel and decisions of our Supreme
Court; this is partly because so far the Canadian decisions have not
departed too markedly from Canadian public opinion, but partly
because the final court's decisions are not the formidable obstacles to
democratic choice that they are in the United States. Our Court's
decisions do not matter as much.
V. MUCH ADO ABOUT METAPHORS
Haigh and Sobkin make the perceptive point that a metaphor
like dialogue is a literary device that is probably best avoided by courts,
because of the risk that it will be misunderstood and employed in ways
that we did not intend.34 It is fair to say that this same point is made in
various fashions by all but one (Roach) of the other commentators: they
too find the use of the word "dialogue" problematic. We said in the
"Charter Dialogue Revisited" article that our problem was that no one
had found a better word for us to use, but Mathen argues that no word
is needed: sentences could be constructed that articulate our thesis
without the word "dialogue" in them. And she has followed up by
constructing some sample sentences for us to use.35 Perhaps all
commentators would be satisfied by a leaner and meaner version of our
thesis from which the word dialogue has been completely banished. We
will have to think about that.
3 Supra note 16 at 90.
s Supra note 27 at 129.
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